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RAHNER AND HEIDEGGER: BEING, HEARING,
AND GOD

IMMEDIATE GOAL of this essay is to delimit
the essential difference between Rahner's philosophy
of religion and Heidegger's philosophy of Being. Why
is it necessary to establish the ground of disagreement between
these thinkers? For one thing, it has been claimed by some
that Heidegger's philosophy has had a profound effect on
Rahner's thought. Louis Roberts, for example, has maintained
"that Heidegger's influence on Rahner is nearly as great as
Marechal's." 1 Rahner himself suggests that "perhaps" Dr.
Roberts overestimates this . . . influence somewhat." 2 In
any case, it will be maintained here that any valid interpretation of the influence of Heidegger on Rahner must take into
account the fundamental difference between them. It will be
maintained that this difference is at the level of the most
basic questions which each poses and therefore has ramifications which go beyond mere methodological differences. This
is not intended to be a refutation to the claim that Heidegger
has influenced Rahner, for he certainly has. It is merely hoped
that the delimitation of the fundamental difference between
their thought will make it possible to assess most accurately
how the one has influenced the other. This essay, however,
will not attempt such an assessment, nor will it attempt a
point by point comparison of Rahner's philosophy with Heidegger's.
A second reason for delimiting the difference between their
philosophies has to do with the relation of Heidegger's thought
to Thomistic philosophy, and more generally to metaphysics.
It is hoped that the investigation will clarify quite emphatically

TI

1
2

Louis Roberts, The A chievement of Karl Rahner (New York, 1967), p. 17.
Karl Rahner, "Forward" to The Achievement of Karl Rahner, p. viii.
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the fundamental differences which underlie any apparent similarities between Heidegger's perspective on the question of
being and the metaphysician's perspective.
The alleged influence of Heidegger on Rahner is evident, in
part, in the notion of "hearing" or "attending" (haren)
which plays a central role in the tnought of both. In Hearers
of the Word Rahner definies man as essentially a potential
hearer of a word from God. The philosophy of religion must
prepare for this hearing by demonstrating metaphysically
that man has this potentiality. Consequently, Rahner defines
theology (theology in the" positive" and fundamental sense
as the reception of Revelation and not in the sense of its
elaboration) as a "hearing." Theology is fundamentally the
" hearing" either of an historical word from God or of his
silence. 3 Similarly, Heidegger's philosophy of Being could be
defined as a type of thinking which is essentially a " hearing,"
or better an " attending," but as ,viII be shown, a very different
kind of hearing than is developed in Rahner's thought.
More fundamental for both thinkers than the notion or
hearing, however, is the notion of "being." Rahner argues
metaphysically to the notion of man as "hearer of the word "
from man's V orgrifJ (pre-comprehension) of being. Similarly,
Heidegger's notion of man as a hearer is developed in his
attempt to think the meaning of Sein (Being).4 The difference
between the notion of hearing in these two philosophies is
ultimately grounded in the difference in the question of being
posed by each. Fundamentally, therefore, this essay is concerned with the issue of being as it is developed in Rahner's
transcendental Thomism and Heidegger's philosophy of Being.
It is necessary to make explicit several further restrictions
of our topic. Since the essay is concerned with the point of
difference between Rahner and Heidegger, and since the volume
Karl Rahner, Hearers of the Word, trans. Michael Richards (New YOl'k~ 1968),
Hereafter: HW.
'For reasons which will become apparent Heidegger's Sein is translated here
as Being (capital B). Rahner's Sein which for him is equivalent to esse is
translated as being (small b).
3

pp. 10-11.
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and complexity of Heidegger's reflection on Being are so extensive, no attempt will be made here to give a balanced or
comprehensive presentation of Heidegger's thought in itself.
The primary focus of attention will be determined by the
presentation of Rahner's thesis. Nor will it be possible to
consider -comprehensively the system of transcendental
Thomism, as it has come to be called, except insofar as it is
involved in the definition of man as a potential hearer of God's
word. Finally, although it is hoped that this essay will help
to indicate how one would proceed to investigate the relation
of Heidegger's philosophy to theology, such an investigationvery involved in itself-will not be pursued.
Since Rahner llas published a reflection on Heidegger's
thought-although not an extensive one, and based only on
the early works-it seems quite natural to consider it first.5
Hopefully the consideration of that article will enable us to
take an initial stance with regard to Rahner's evaluation of
Heidegger, and will also serve as a general introduction to
Heidegger's thought. An examination of Rahner's philosophy
of religion as developed in Hearers of the Word will follow,
with attention focused on those elements which subsequently
will be shown as the fundamental bone of contention between
Heidegger and Rahner. Having done this it will be necessary
to re-evaluate Rahner's critique of Heidegger's thought in the
light of what will be maintained is a more faithful rea.ding of
Heidegger's question about Being. It will then be sho"vn what
sense" hearing" comes to have in regard to such a question.
It will not be possible to limit the consideration of Heidegger
to one or two sta.tements of his position and so indications will
have to be gleaned from a number of his ,vorks. The essay
concludes, contrary to the general consensus, that the philosophies of Rahner and Heidegger differ at the very level of
the question asked.

*

*

*

li Karl Rahner, "The Concept of Existential Philosophy in Hcidegger," trans.
Andrew Tallon, Philosophy Today, 13 (1969), pp. 1~6-87. Originally published
in French in 1940. Hereafter: CEo
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Rahner's essay on Heidegger is brief and attempts merely

to introduce its readers to the broad outlines of his philosophy.
It does not attempt either a comprehensive evaluation of his
thought or a comparison of it to other systems of thought.
Since Rahner does restrict the s~ope of his article, it would
be unfair to evaluate it as an extensive and nuanced interpretation, much less as necessarily representing Rahner's current
evaluation of Heideggerian philosophy. Nevertheless, the
essay does situate Heidegger's question within a specific context, and it does project and evaluate the possible development
of Heidegger's thought from that context. Although Rahner's
conjectures are only provisory, they nevertheless firmly establish the ground on which Rahner's thought confronts Heidegger's. It will be shown in the discussion of Hearers of the Word
how Rahner moves from this ground himself. In our own
re-evaluation of, this essay, however, it will be shown that
the ground upon which Rahner bases his interpretation of
Heidegger is indeed very shaky ground. Although few of
Heidegger's later works were available in 1940, Rahner's interpretation misunderstands the most essential points made even
in the works which he did consider, sc. SZ, KM, WM, and WG.6
This is, of course, not meant as a criticism of Rahner but as a
preparation for the delimitation of the difference between his
philosophy and Heidegger's.
Rahner considers Heidegger a metaphysician. As a meta6 The following abbreviations will be used
to refer to the translations of
Heidegger's works:
EM-An Introduction to Metaphysics trans. Ralph Manheim (New York, 1961).
KM-Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics trans. James S. Churchhill (Bloomington, Indiana, 1968).
SZ-Being and Time, trans. John ~Iacquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York,
1966). The pagination of the German edition is given in this translation and
used also in this paper.
WG-Tke Essence of Reason, trans. Terrence Malick (Evanston, 1969).
WM-" What is Metaphysics? " trans. R. F. C. Hull and Alan Crick, in Existence and
Being, ed. Werner Brock (Chicago, 1970), pp. 825-61.
Intro to WM_H The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics," trans. and ed.
Walter Kaufmann, Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre (New York,
1969), pp. 206-21.
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physician Heidegger, according to Rahner, asks about being as
such, in its totality, as that which is most general. Rahner
understands this concern with being as that which is most
general, as a concern about the act of being, the esse characteristic of all beings (ens). Likewise, he understands Heidegger's
concern with being in its totality as a concern with esse as the
unifying aspect under which all possible objects are able to be
comprehended and summed up, and as the ultimate cause to
which they can be related. Metaphysics insofar as it asks this
question about being is called "ontology," and insofar as it
looks for the universal basis of all being it is "theology." All
philosophy since Plato and Aristotle is at its base, therefore,
"onto-theological." According to Rahner, Heidegger accepts
this heritage-this concern about being as such-and makes it
his own. (CE, 128)
What is distinctive, according to Rahner's interpretation,
about Heidegger's approach to metaphysics is that he seeks
to put it on a new foundation. The whole tradition of philosophy from Plato to Hegel has conceived being in terms of
logos and thus as correlative to thought or reason. l\Ian was
defined as the animal rationalis and the question of being was
"interpreted from the logical grasp of being by thought."
(CE, 130) Rahner maintains that Heidegger's originality lies
in the fact that he asks the "question about being without
conceiving it beforehand as onto-logy." (CE, 130) Thus
Heidegger situates the question about being on a new plane
which does not presuppose the definition of man or being in
terms of logos, but which sees man as the place where being is
" comprehended" in a more fundamental way. According to
Rahner, this is why Heidegger defines his task as the establishing of a more "fundamental ontology." It is also for this
reason that Heidegger wants to go back beyond the traditional
starting point of metaphysics to the point of its origin with
the Pre-Socratics when being was not conceived beforehand
in terms of logic. (CE, 130)
Rahner maintains that this more fundamental investigation
of the being question assumes the form of a transcendental
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analysis. For this reason Rahner situates Heidegger within the
tradition of modem philosophy which according to Rahner is
essentially transcendental philosophy ....4.s Rahner sees it, "a
question is posed on the transcendental plane when it asks for
the a priori conditions that m!tke knowledge of an object
possible," that is to say, when the investigator himself becomes
the object of investigation. (CE, 129) Since being as such is
not accessible as this or that being, and since it cannot be
obtained in its pure state, the only access which one has to
being is through man who must already possess some knowledge of being to raise the question in the first place. In other
words, Rahner tells us, in order to ask about the a priori
conditions which render possible the knowledge of being, the
investigator must become the object of investigation. (CE,
129)
Rahner notes that it is important to keep in mind that
Heidegger's sole concern is always with the question about
being. The transcendental analytic of man, therefore, aims at
resolving the question about being. It is not in any sense
aimed at establishing an anthropology. The question of man
is always subordinate to the question about being. (CE, 129)
Accordingly, Rahner maintains that we are able to define
Heidegger's philosophy as:
the transcendental investigation of what man is insofar as he raises
the question of being, an investigation that rejects the initial
traditional stance in this matter-exclusively intellectual-and
undertaken with the intention of providing an answer to the
question of being in general. (CE, lSI; printed entirely in italics)

Rahner tells us that Heidegger's transcendental investigation of man is an analysis of man as "Dasein." What
does Heidegger mean by this term? . 4ccording
.
to Rahner,
"Dasein" does not designate simply being-present-there (etrela-present) in the sense in which one could affinn anything
whatever, but rather "Dasein" is being-human itself----each
of us. It is characterized inherently by the transcendence
which orients man towards being, and from which derives the
ability to understand oneself in a definite way, to take an
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attitude towards oneself. As a conquence "existence" in
Heidegger's special terminology denotes not the fact that a
being is, but rather it denotes ". . . man, insofar as he is in
some way the object of this free self-disposition." (CE, 131)
The existential analytic of Dasein, therefore, consists in the
determination of the general and formal structures which are
proper to Dasein as a mode of being-human, in other words as
"existence," as a state of "openness" (transcendence) to
being. These structures are called" existentials." SZ is almost
entirely devoted to an explication of these structures. The
analysis displays itself, Rahner maintains, in two stages. The
first consists in a phenomenological description of Dasein as
"being-in-the-world." The second reduces this being-in-theworld to its ultimate sense as "being-in-time." (CE, 131-32)
Rahner explains that being-in-the-world describes Dasein's
" existence" as Heidegger conceives it. Man is, only insofar as
he is in the world. This being-in-the-world is not a secondary
process by which Dasein as a closed subject in some way
comes into contact v.rith an exterior world. Rather, from the
very start Dasein is already outside of itself in the world and
in the things of the world. Being in the world according to
Rahner, therefore, consists in the a priori possibility of Dasein
to be related to the things of the world and the world itself.
Man is from the very start open to the totality of the world,
and the totality of the \vorld is, albeit under an empty form,
given him right from the outset. (CE, 132)

Rahner explains that this being-in-the-world has a triple
aspect which is described by Heidegger as Verstehen, Geworfenheit, and Verfallenneit. The first term refers to Heidegger's
contention that Dasein is not present to itself by a static
knowledge of properties but rather is present to itself by a
stretching-ahead-of-self-toward-the-future. This " tension-ahead-of-self-toward-the-future" is " understanding, man's way
of comprehending and grasping himself, of grasping and restructuring his own power-to-be." (CE, 133) Through this
Verstehen Dasein finds itself always brought into question and
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is thus present to itself. Rahner notes that according to
Heidegger this stretching of Dasein towards its "subjective
possibilities" must always begin from Dasein's past-a past
which has been imposed upon Dasein and of which it has no
hold. This " state-of-being-thr0wn into this or that condition"
(etat-de-jete-dans-teUes et telles conditions) Heidegger calls
" thrownness" (Geworfenheit). Furthermore, the tension-ahead-of-self-toward-the-future from the past-into-which-it-hasbeen-thrown necessarily involves Dasein with the things of
the world to such an extent that Dasein becomes prey to them
and enslaved. This enslavement Heidegger calls" Verfallenheit." Being-in-the-world as Verstehn, Geworfenheit, and Verfallenheit is summed up by the term "Care" (in German
"Sorge," in French" Sollicitude"). (CE, 132-33)
The second stage of the analysis of SZ-the reduction of
Dasein to its ultimate sense-becomes evident, Rahner observes, when, on the one hand, it is noted that the proper and
strict possibility towards which Dasein carries itself is the
certain possibility of its own impossibility, of its death, and
when, on the other hand, it is noted that to the three aspects
of Care correspond the elements of human duration (la
" duree " humaine): future, present, and past. Duration, here,
does not refer to the "time" we calculate, but rather to the
foundation of such time in the temporal structure of Dasein
as: the stretching-ahead-of-self-towards-its-ownmost-possibility or future (sc. death) , from its depenedence on a past into
which it has been thrown, realized in the present as a response
to the attraction of the future, and the compulsion and constraint of the past. Rahner concludes, then, that for Heidegger
Dasein as Care and as a being essentially towards death, is
by its very structure temporal. Dasein is intrinsically finite.
(CE, 133-34)
Having outlined the general structure of Heidegger's existential analytic of Desein, Rahner returns to the original
question-what is being as such?-and discovers that SZ never
directly addresses itself to this question, leaving its answer to
a proposed second volume. But although Rahner is unable to
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extract the kernel of Heideggerian metaphysics from SZ, he
does attempt to draw from it and from indications in WM
and WG some" conjectures" about Heidegger's answer to the
being question.
Dasein, Rahner observes, is a being-towards-death-a projection out of past and present towards Dasein's future. This
projection is not a property of Dasein, but rather is the very
act of being-human. The original mode of the projection or
anticipatory grasp is not a theoretical knowledge in terms of
logic, but rather it is an experience or state-of-disposition
(Tallon translates "etat d' ame" as "state of soul") which
Heidegger defines as " anxiety." This dispositional state reveals
" nothingness" (neant) as the ultimate ,. virtuality" of Dasein,
and as that in which Dasein is already engaged. Dasein's
transcendence, his passing beyond beings, is a passing to nothingness. Rahner maintains, therefore, that Heidegger appears
to identify pure being and pure nothingness. Consequently,
all beings as participants in nothingness are necessarily finite.
Rahner observes that this view does not seem to allow even the
possibility of raising a question about the existence of God.
As far as Rahner can tell, Heidegger's ontology offers no
support for a pure Being positively superior as such to all
finitude. (CE, 134-35)
Although it seems like Heidegger's thought allows no room
for the idea of God, Rahner notes that Heidegger, himself.,
denies that his analysis says anything either for or against the
possibility of God. Thus Rahner maintains it is impossible until
the completion of his ontology to tell for sure if it will give
to metaphysics "a meaning that is either the most radically
atheist or the most profoundly religious." (CE, 137) All we
can do, Rahner insists, is note that up till now the existential
analytic of Dasein logically seems to be not an ontology but
an Ontochronic (an expression Rahner attributes to Heidegger
himself) -" a science which showing that the meaning of all
being as such, and, absolutely, the meaning of Being, is nothingness." (CE, 136)
Rahner does not attempt to analyze Heidegger's thought
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from the point of view of Christianity, but he does explain a
little more fully what he means when he suggests that the
ultimate resolution of Heidegger's philosophy will be either
most radically atheistic or most profoundly religious. Heidegger's eventual ontology will lay ~he foundation for atheism if,
as Rahner seems to think it is to be feared, the last word of its
anthropology is nothingness, for then the last word of the
ontology still to come must also be nothingness. On the other
hand, Rahner claims that Heidegger's philosophy could lay the
groundwork for a profoundly religious view if the analysis of
Dasein in its ultimate stage discovers the infinity of the
absolute as the first a priori of human transcendence, and if it
discovers the true destiny of man in the choice between eternal
nothingness and eternal life before God. In this case Heidegger's analysis of man as an historical being, as an essentially
"finite creature," and as a temporal being renders possible an
attentiveness to Revelation.
In this case, to jar man loose fronl the pure idea and cast him into
his own existence and history, as Heidegger is doing, would be to
prepare him, to make him attentive to the fact-existential, historical-of a divine revelation, would be to open him to "the God
of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob," to the" Word of Life, seen, heard,
touched" by human hands, "Jesus of Nazareth. . .. " (CE, 137)

This description is striking because it serves as a nearly perfect
introduction to and crystalization of the philosophy of religion
developed in Hearers of the Word. 7
Rahner's aim in Hearers of the Word is to lay the foundation
for a philosophy of religion faithful to the principles of the
Thomistic tradition yet unique in that it raises a question
never explicitly posed by St. Thomas. (cf. HW, 33) He
suggests that the nature of this philosophy of religion could be
most clearly defined by comparing it with theology. It is
necessary, therefore, to ask the question about the relationship
7 This similarity of Rahner's philosophy of religion and his projection of the
possible developments of Heidegger's philosophy of Being suggest the value of
following the argument of HW in this preliminary delimitation of the essential
difference between their philosophies.
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of these two sciences. The question of the relationship between
sciences, however, is ultimately a question about their common
foundation, and that science which serves as foundation for all
other sciences and grants them their a priori attitudes and
principles-whether or not these principles are self-consciousis called-metaphysics. The question of the relationship between
the philosophy of religion and theology is consequently a metaphysical question. Science of any kind, however, is a human
activity. Thus, the question of the relationship between the
philosophy of religion and theology is ultimately a metaphysical
question about the nature of man. It is what, in the previous
article, Rahner called a transcendental question. (HW, 3-7)
If the question presented so far is probed deeper, Rahner
maintains that a series difficulty will be discovered. "For
classical Christian philosophy of religion . . . knowledge of
God . . . is no static, self-contained science, but a profound
element of ontology in general." (HW, 7) But if this is true,
then the philosophy of religion as ontology (or the metaphysics
of being) is the same as the science in which it finds its ground.
The question of the philosophy of religion is thus a question
about the "self-establishment of metaphysics." Ultimately,
therefore, "the question about the philosophy of religion becomes the question as to why man pursues metaphysics and
being, and how human metaphysics can reach up to God."

(HW, 8)
If this philosophy of religion is to be truly a " philosophy"
and not a "theology" there can be no question of its justifying
or explicating a revelation from God. On the other hand, if
theology is to be truly "theology" and not "philosophy,"
then the philosophy of religion cannot a priori reduce revelation
to merely what is discovered by reason. To establish itself the
philosophy of religion must ask if there is any "reason" to
suppose that man is a potential hearer of a divine revelation.
The asking of such a question is a purely philosophical venture,
but as such it lays the foundation for theology-the actual
hearing of the revealed word-by pointing out to man whether
or not he should seek such a revealed word in history. Rahner
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proposes that, in fact, it can be shown that man by his very
nature is a potential hearer of a possible revelation from God
in history. (HW, 7-27)
Rahner describes the method which he chooses to achieve
this end in terms very similar to t,hose with which he described
Heidegger's existential analytic of Dasein. Rahner proposes:
to sketch the outlines of a metaphysical analytic of man with
reference to the capacity to hear the word of God which is addressed
to man as the revelation of the unknown God allowing the history
of man to appear. To put a question metaphysically, however, is
to put a question about being. (HW, 32)

Rahner's pursuit of this question about the being of man
establishes the three propositions of metaphysical anthropology
that constitute the essence of his philosophy of religion: 1)
that "man is a spirit (a characterization which stamps his
whole being as man) and thus has an ear that is open to any
word whatsoever that may proceed from the mouth of the
Eternal" (HW, 67) ; 2) "that man is that existent thing who
stands in free love before the God of a possible revelation ...
(and who) is attentive to the speech or silence of God in the
measure in which he opens himself in free love to this message
of the speech or silence of the God of revelation" (HW, 108) ;
and 3) that" man is that existent thing who must listen for an
historical revelation of God, given in history and possibly in
human speech." (HW, 161)
These three propositions and the philosophy of religion
which they constitute are based on Rahner's notion of being as
that which is revealed to man through a preconceptual, nonthematic grasp, but which at the same time is hidden from
man because of his finitude. It is at this level where the
essential difference between Rahner and Heidegger emerges, so
this is where the present essay will find its focus.

*

*

*

Rahner begins his analytic for the being of man in a manner
that appears to be similar to Heidegger's posing of the ques-
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tion about being. Metaphysics asks about the being of that
which is. It "enquires into the ultimate reasons, into the
final cause of reality. . . ." (HW, 33) This questioning is
unavoidable. "We are compelled to ask: What is the' being'
of that which is?" (HW, 34) ; and it is precisely as men that
we are compelled to do so. Rahner develops this notion more
fully in Spirit in the W orld.8 There he observes that man
questions, and that this questioning is irreducible because every
question presupposes a placing in question. Rahner maintains
that man necessarily questions because being in its totality is
given to him only as something questionable. For Rahner the
ontological implication of the fact that man necessarily questions is the conclusion that man exists as the question about
being in its totality. Thus, the question about being as posed
by man is the point of departure for metaphysics.
Since nothing can be asked about the totally unknown,
Rahner observes that the fact that man poses the question
about being attests to an a priori grasp of being in general.
Thus Rahner believes that he is able to deduce from man's
existence, as "the question about existence," the familiar
Thomistic teaching that "human thinking is always accompanied by an unexpressed knowledge of being [esse] as the
condition of all knowledge of the existing individual." (HW,
36)

Rahner proceeds further to note that being can obviously
be questioned only insofar as it is known. From this Rahner
deduces the Thomistic position that knowability is the most
fundamental note of being. "A thing which is, and the possible
object of a cognition, are one and the same, for the being of that
which is, is knowability." (HW, 38-39) This implies, Rahner
argues, the Thomistic position that "being is knowing and
being known in their original unity." (HW, 44) The sense of
knowing here is not that of reaching from something inside to
something outside but is rather conceived as a presence-to-seIf.
8 Cf. Karl Rahner, Spirit in the World, trans. William Dych (New York, 1968),
pp. 57-78. Hereafter SW.
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For Rahner, therefore, "the essence of being is the beingpresent-to-itself of being or the luminosity of being to itself as
" subjectivity." (HW, 37-44)
Rahner argues, furthermore, that although man can deduce
the unity of being and knowing from the fact of his existence
as the question about being, the questionability of being as
such-that is to say, the fact that man has to raise the question,
the fact that he is not absolute self-presence-rules out any
form of pantheism or " debased idealism." Man "has being,"
but is not pure absolute being itself. Man is finite. From this
fact Rahner argues to the Thomistic notion that being is
"analogous." By this term Rahner means to suggest that the
" attribution of being itself is an interiorly variable quantity."
(HW, 47) In other words, the degree of self-presence or selfluminosity varies from being to being. A TInite being is, therefore, only to the degree that it "has being," only to the degree
that it has a potentiality for self presence. (HW, 45-52)
But what is this being as such which Rahner conceives as
self-luminosity and as analogically attributable to all beings?
Furthermore, what is man's relation to being? Rahner suggests
that the answers to these question can be discovered by an
analysis of the act of judgment. In every judgment a predicate
is affirmed of a subject. Furthermore, insofar as the judgment
is true, it is itself affirmed of something that is in itself
independent of the passing of judgment. By this process man
establishes the object of his judgment as something different
from and independent of his judgment, and therefore as different from and independent of himself. In this way man constitutes himself as a subject opposed to an object. As subject
he is able to return to himself by turning out towards (that is
to say, by objectifying) the objects with which he is initially
one. It is only through this process that man is able to
comprehend himself as a subject who subsists-in-himself and
who is free (i. e., of that which stands against him) .
Now the question which Rahner poses is this: what is " the
ultimate cause of the possibility of man, in his subsisting-inhimself, taking a position distinct from the things he handles
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in conscious thought-judgment "? (HW, 56) He argues that in
essence this question is only another side of a more familiar
problem in Scholastic philosophy. In every judgment a thing is
affirmed as a "this" or a "that." This is also true of human
activity considered more generally. Man always deals with
this particular thing or that. The ability to take hold of this
or that particular thing presupposes the ability to comprehend
it under a general concept, that is to say, the ability to elevate
the perceptions of the senses to the level of the concept. This is
what in Tholnistic epistemology is caned" abstraction." To ask
about the condition of possibility of human subsisting-in-self,
therefore, is to ask about the possibility of abstraction. (HW,
53-57)
Rahner describes absraction as the ability to " loosen away
from" or to detach the" thisness" (in Scholastic terminology
the form or quiddity) from any example of a particular
"this." "Abstraction is thus the recognition of the nonrestriction of the 'thisness' that is given in the particular
sense." (HW,58) Now in order to elevate the sense impression
of a particular "this" to a recognition of a non -restricted
"this," the intellect must grasp the particular as "limited."
But to recognize this" limit," it must already have grasped it
in reference to a " something more." This" something more"
is what Rahner means by "being in general." The grasping
in terms of this more is what he means by the preconcept
(VorgrifJ) .
In each particular cognition it [the intellect] al\vays reaches out
beyond the particular object. and thus grasps it, not just as its
unrelated, dead "thisness," but in its limitation and reference to
the totality of all possible objects. . . . The pre-concept is the
condition for the possibility of the universal concept, of the
abstraction \vhich in turn is what makes possible the objectification
of the datum of sense perception and so of conscious subsistingin-oneself. (HW, 59)

Rahner argues that the object of this Vorgriff cannot be an
object like those which are made known through the Vorgriff
itself. Thus it would appear that to an extent Rahner's position
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is similar to Heidegger's who, as was shown, holds that
"Being" is not like beings. It is in the further elaboration of
this a priori grasp that Rahner seems to consciously distinguish
his position from Heidegger's. As was seen previously, Rahner
believed that Heidegger's Dasein as a transcendence to being
is essentially a transcendence to nothingness. This alleged
notion, as it was elaborated in WM, was based on the argument
that negation can only be grounded in a prior comprehension
of "nothingness." Here Rahner argues that just the opposite is
the case-that the notion of negation is derived through man's
Vorgriff of an absolute" having being" and that the concept
of non-being is derived from the notion of negation.9 Why?
Rahner argues that human cognition is related to that
which is, and not what is-not-at least insofar as all knowledge
begins in sense perception. He maintains that, if the knowledge
of the limitation of the objects of knowledge can be explained
in terms of a VorgrifJ of being as positive, there is no need to
posit a transcendence to nothingness. But, Rahner continues,
it has already been shown that beings are to the extent that
they" have being." They are grasped not in terms of nothing
but in terms of a VorgrifJ of the perfection of pure "having
being." Rahner maintains that this can be deduced from the
fact of the question of being, from the judgment, and from the
freedom of human activity. "To the extent that judgment
and free action are necessarily part of man's existence, the
pre-concept of being pure and simple in its own intrinsically
proper infinitude is part of the fundamental constitution of
human existence." (HW, 63) Since Rahner has already ruled
out the possibility of pantheism, that being which has being
absolutely must be God himself. Thus Rahner claims that:
God is posited, too, with the same necessity as this pre-concept.
He is the thing of which is affirmed absolute "having existence."
' I do not mean to suggest that the arguments we considered in Hearers of the
Word were intended as a direct answer to Heidegger's analysis. Bahner appears
to be speaking much more generally. But it also seems that Heidegger's position,
as Rahner understands it, is among those which he believes his arguments refute.
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It is true that the pre-concept does not present any object at all
along with itself. But in this pre-concept (as the necessary and
ever already actualized condition for 'every human cognition and
every human action) the existence of an existent thing of absolute
" having being" ( tha t is, of God) has already been affirmed if not
presented. In the pre-concept the cause of his specific possibility is
unknowningly affirmed. (HW, 63-64)

Thus Rahner claims that from the very movement of the
human intellect we are able to establish the existence of God.
Granting this, it is not difficult to see why Rahner rejects
any metaphysics which claims that negation must be grounded
in a transcendence towards nothingness. Because of the
VorgrifJ of absolute being, the subject is able to perceive finite
beings as limited. Negation is thus derived from the comprehension of a " less" or " limit" in terms of a " more" or " full,"
'rhe concept of non-being is thus also derived from the Vorgriff
of esse absolutum.
Non-being does not precede negation, but the pre-concept relative
to the unlimited is in itself already the negation of the finite, to
the extent that, as condition for the possibility of its cognition, and
through its rising above the finite, it reveals; eo ipso, its finitude.
The affirmation of the thing that is in itself unlimited is therefore
the possibility for negation, and not the other way around. Thus
we are not required to assume a transcendence relation to nonbeing, which, preceding all negation and providing its foundation,
would have to disclose the finitude of an existent thing for the first
time. Positive unlimitation of the transcendental horizon of human
knowledge automatically displays the finitude of all that does not
fill up this horizon. (HW, 62)

These analyses lead Rahner to the conclusion that man by
nature is a spirit who is able to affinn the existence of God, and
furthennore, because of the analogy of being, he has the
potentiality for a more extensive knowledge of God. "Man is
the absolute receptivity for being pure and simple." It is not
possible to pursue Rahner's existential analysis further. In the
discussion which follows, he argues that although being is
luminous, man's' grasp of it is necessarily limited because of his
own finitude. He argues, furthermore, that God as absolute
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being must be conceived as a free spirit ,vho could reveal more
about himself to man if it was his divine ,viII to do so. Because
of the very nature of man's receptivity as a composite of body
and spirit, the place of such a free revelation would have to be
human history and the mode ,yould have to be the sensible
word (understood in its broadest meaning as either word or
act). Man, therefore, has a potentiality for" hearing" such
an historical word if God speaks. Furthermore, the philosophy
of religion can show man his need to look for such a word in
history.
Perhaps at this point it would be helpful to summarize.
Rahner maintains that Heidegger is essentially a metaphysician
concerned with establishing a new, more fundamental ontology
through a transcendental analysis of man as the one who
necessarily poses the question about being. As far as Rahner
can tell, however, Heidegger's analysis seems to lead to
the conclusion that man transcends towards nothingness. In
Hearers of the Word Rahner is also concerned with carrying
out an existential analytic of man as the one who necessarily
poses the question about being. Like IIeidegger he appears to
maintain that man is able to raise the question about being
because man already has a comprehension of being as such.
Like Heidegger he appears to maintain that the being of which
man has a pre-comprehension is distinct from all other beings.
But unlike Heidegger (as Rahner understands him) , he maintains that the ultimate sense of being is not nothingness but
rather God, grasped in the movement of all human affirmation,
whether in act or deed, towards pure and absolute "havingbeing." As such, God constitutes not only the object of human
activity, but also more significantly, the condition of its
possibility. As a composite of body and spirit man possesses
the potentiality to receive a further revelation from God if one
is given. Man is thus a potential "hearer" of a divine word.

*

*

*

Rahner's evaluation of Heidegger's ontology in the article
discussed and his implicit refutation of Heidegger's alleged
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"nihilism" in Hearers of the Word presupposes that Heidegger,
like Rahner, is asking about "being as such, under its most
general and total aspect.~' It presupposes that "by most
general is meant, ultimately the simple fact of being, esse,
characteristic of every ens," and that" by most total is meant
esse again as the unifying aspect under which every possible
object can be grasped, summed up, and related to its ultimate
and unique explanation." (CF, 128) Rahner, therefore, is
asking about" beings as beings " or " being as being" (ens qua
ens) , just as Aristotle and St. Thomas. The difference is that
he founds his metaphysics on a transcendental analysis. What
is more significant to our discussion is that he presupposes
that Heidegger's problematic is, and must be, the Salne. As
Heidegger's thought has developed, however, it has become
increasingly clear that his understanding has emerged out of
what he believes is a very different question.
In the" Introduction" to WM (written in 1949) , Heidegger
notes that the science which traditionally has been called
metaphysics has al\vays asked about being as beings, or about
being (the totality or beings) as being. The asking of this
question, as Rahner noted, has led according to Heidegger's
analysis to two distinct pursuits. The one seeks to understand, that is to say, to represent, that which is common to
all beings-,their beingness, or in Thomistic terminology esse.
l"his study is called "ontology." The other seeks to understand the beingness of being in terms of their cause or sufficient
reason-which for Rahner is esse absolutum (God) -and it is
called" theology." 10 Both questions ask about beings, or in
terms which Heidegger would insist are misleading, about finite
being. Heidegger argues that he is asking a very different
question. He is not asking about being but about Being itself
as distinct from beings. Thus it will be maintained here that
Heidegger's question about Being (it will be helpful to use a
capital" B " to designate Heidegger's "Sein") is different from
Rahner's question about being.
10 Here "theology" refers to a branch of metaphysics, not to the Church's
explication of Revelation.
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In An Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger attempts to
introduce the question of Being as he understands it. He maintains there that because metaphysics, in the ordinary sense of
the term, is concerned only with questioning beings as beings
(ta physika), it can be called a "physics." If philosophic
thought is to have a solid foundation, however, it is necessary
to go beyond questions about being to the question about Being
itself (meta ta physica). As he saw it in 1935, "even in the
doctrines of being as pure act (Thomas Aquinas) , as absolute
concept (Hegel), as eternal recurrence of the identical will
to power (Nietzsche), metaphysics has remained unalterably
'physics.'" (EM, 14) Heidegger believes that the question of
Being which he asks is not at all the same as the question
which metaphysicians through the ages have asked.
Although this position is more obvious in these later works,
it has been the direction of his thought from the very beginning.
As his problematic has developed it has become clear that it is
not a question of Heidegger giving up metaphysics or gradually
disengaging himself from the metaphysical understanding of
being. Rather, it is a question of a difference, there from the
beginning, between his problematic and that of the tradition,
gradually becoming more explicit. ll It is at the level of the
very question asked where the difference begins to emerge
between Rahner's question about esse and Heidegger's question
about Being itself.
It is just this difference, however, which is overlooked if the
existential analytic of Dasein proposed in SZ is interpreted,
as Rahner interprets it, as an attempt like those of Kant,
Descartes, or any modern metaphysician to put metaphysics
on a new foundation. It is true, of course, that in the introduction to SZ Heidegger describes his task as the establishing
of a " fundamental ontology" through the" existential analytic
of Dasein." (SZ, 13) 12 He also suggests, however, that" funda11 The analysis here does not wish to deny that there has been a "tum" in
Heidegger's thought; but the fact that there has been a "tum" does not mean
that his problem has essentially changed. The fundamental question remains the
same even though the questions asked have changed.
12 Italics here and in all following quotes are Heidegger's unless otherwise stated.
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mental ontology" is fundamental not because, as Rahner
suggests, it bases the knowledge of being on a new foundation
or because it asks the question about beings in a new way
but because it asks a question which is more original than any
such question about beings. The aim of SZ is not to lay the
basis for an answer to the question about being, nor to ask the
same question in a new way, but rather " ... to work out the
question of Being . . ." itself. (SZ, 1) Thus, when he says
further that "our provisional aim is the interpretation of
time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever
of Being," (SZ, 1) this should be understood to suggest not only
that "time" will help to answer the question of Being but
primarily and more significantly that time will indicate the
very sense of the question itself. It is easy to aSSUlue that
Heidegger is only polemicizing against Neo-Kantains when he
says that it is necessary "to raise anew the question of the
meaning of Being." (SZ, 1) It becomes clear as he progresses,
however, that he is speaking to the whole metaphysical
tradition.
What are the indications of this thesis in SZ-the principal
work that Rahner considered in his essay? In the first place,
Heidegger speaks of the need for a " destruction of ontology "
and the" history of ontology." (SZ, 19-27) He explains that
the need for destruction "is essentially bound up with the way
the question of Being is formulated ...." (SZ, 23) Is it to be
supposed that Heidegger intends a complete denial of the
philosophic past? No, for he insists that the aim of the destruction is positive, as well as negative, and that it can achieve
this aim only if it starts within the history of thought. But
how begin from a destruction? What is the aim of the destruction? He seems to hint-and seen from the perspective of
Heidegger's later works it is a hint difficult to miss-that
fundamental ontology will begin from a rediscovery of an
original beginning though a destruction of what has followed
from it.
. . . taking the question of Being as our clue, we are to destroy
the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive at
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those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways
of determining the nature of Being-the ways which have guided
us ever since. (SZ, 22)

In the pages which follow Heidegger states that this forgottenness of Being applies alike to the Greeks, the Scholastics,
Decartes, Kant, and Hegel. Now Rahner had maintained that
Heidegger wanted to go beyond the traditional starting point
of Metaphysics because he sought a foundation for ontology
which did not conceive " being" beforehand in terms of logic.
This is true, but only half true. Heidegger is seeking not merely
a new foundation but is seeking a new foundation in the asking
of a new question. It is because a new question is asked that
his ontology is more fundamental.
But how precisely is the question of Being as Heidegger
understands it different from the metaphysician's notion of
being? What is the meaning of the word "Being" in the
phrase" the question of Being"? The problem which the metaphysician confronts with SZ, as Rahner noted, is that Heidegger never gets to the task of defining the sense of Being-at
least from a metaphysical point of view. What then can be
discerned about the question of Being from the SZ analysis?
For one thing, it has already been noted that to ask for a
metaphysical definition, or even the grounds for one, from SZ
is apparently contrary to Heidegger's intention. It seems that
what ought to be sought is Heidegger's understanding of how
the question should be asked. How? He maintains that the
clue to how will be discovered, as Rahner observed, by examining Dasein, the place where the question is asked, and seeing
in this examination that" time" is the ultimate transcendental
horizon for the question of Being. The existential analytic of
Dasein could, then, be called "transcendental" but not in the
sense that Rahner gives to the term. In seeking an understanding of Dasein's comprehension of Being Heidegger is proposing
to lay the basis for a question which he maintains that Kant
never posed. Heidegger wants it to be understood that the
question which guides him has been ignored and forgotten in
metaphysics and ontology. The term of that question-Being
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-should not be understood in terms of the history of philosophy and so not as a "transcendental philosophy" in the
traditional sense. Rahner's contention that Heidegger is essentially a transcendental philosopher is thus very misleading if
not altogether incorrect.
What, then, does Heidegger reveal about the term of his
inquiry in SZ? First, he tells us that Being is "that which
determines beings as beings, that on the basis of which beings
are already understood . . . . " (SZ, 6) Although-or perhaps
because-Being is that which determines beings and is COlnmon
to them all, Heidegger insists that Being is not a being or in
any way like beings.
The Being of beings" is" not itself a being. If ,ve are to undersand the problem of Being, our first philosophic step consists in not
p.,v(}6v Tt,va ot,'Y)Y f. [a (}t,a , in not" telling a story"-that is to say, in not
defining beings as beings by tracing them back in their origin to
some other beings, as if Being had the character of some possible
being. (SZ, 6)

Heidegger makes the same point when he says:
Being as the basic theme of philosophy is no class or genus of
heings, yet it pertains to every being. Its" universality" is to be
sought higher up. Being and the structure of Being lie beyond
every being and every possiblp, character which a being may
possess. Being is the transcenden~ pure and simple. (SZ, 38)

This transcending, however, is not an abstraction, nor does
Heidegger propose to seek it through abstraction. Rather, he
intends to " work out the question of the meaning of Being and
to do so concretely." (SZ, 1)
A further indication of what Heidegger intends to interrogate
in the question about Being can be found in his analysis of
the word " phenolnenology." The term originates from two
Greek words: ~avv6~EvOV and A6yo~. Heidegger maintains that
cPavv6~EvOV signifies that which shows itself in itself or manifests
itself as itself. "Accordingly the ~aLv6~Eva or 'phenomena'
are the totality of what lies in the light of day or can be brought
to light-what the Greeks sometimes identified simply with
'Ta. OV'Ta (beings)." (SZ, 28) For Heidegger, however, this
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"showing-itself-in-itself, signifies a distinctive way in which
something can be encountered." (SZ, 31) Heidegger maintains
that the real meaning of the second term, A.6'Yo~, has been
covered up by later interpretations of it as reason, judgment,
concept, definition, ground or relationship. He argues that
the word originally meant to make manifest what one is talking
about. It is a "letting something be seen." Phenomehology
thus means to let be manifest or un-hidden that which manifests itself. '¥hat then does phenomenology let be seen?
Heidegger argues that:
Manifestly, it is something that proximally and for the most part
does not show itself at all: it is something that lies hidden, in
contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does sho\v
itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to it so
essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground. (SZ, 35)

What can this something be? Heidegger argues that it is
Being.
Yet that which remains hidden in an egregious sense, or which
relapses and gets covered up again, or which shows itself only
"in disguise," is not just this or that, but rather the Being of
beings, as our previous observations have shown. This Being can
be cov~red up so extensively that it becomes forgotten and no
questions arise about it or about its meaning. (SZ, 60)

This analysis of the meaning of "phenomenology" is not
meant merely as a digression into the nature of Heidegger's
methodology. Rather it intends to reveal a basic characteristic of Heidegger's understanding of Being which gets developed already in his conception of phenomenology as the only
adequate way to do fundamental ontology. That which shows
itself is the Being of beings. Being as a " showing-itself is not
just any showing itself." It is not just something like appearing.
Being is the foundation of any kind of appearing at all. It
underlies all beings. Behind this showing-itself (Being), there
is nothing else. Yet it is the character of this showing-itself,
that it can be hidden and forgotten while one gazes on the
beings it lets be manifest. (SZ, 36-37)
Heidegger is thus seeking the meaning of the Being of beings.
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Although Being appears to be correlative with the beings which
it manifests., it is also distinct from them. It is not in any
sense a being, or like beings. For this reason one cannot speak
about Being in any way like one would speak about beings.
Nor can Being be thought of as proceeding from a being. It is
a "pure transcending" which is beyond beings. But note,
Heidegger does not say Being is a transcendent (noun), for
example, a transcendent Being. He rejects as missing the
issue any question which like the one posed by Rahner seeks to
trace beings to a cause (i. e., God). This is why Heidegger
insists that his thought does not speak either for or against the
existence of God. From the perspective of his question the
problem of God does not arise. Since Rahner, however does
not note the difference between his question (the metaphysical
question) and Heidegger's, he is not able to see how Heidegger
can claim that the analysis has not prejudged the God issue.
Heidegger, however, is not seeking to detennine the source of
beings, but the meaning of Being itself. Being is that manifesting by which beings are " present" to Dasein. Although Being
manifests itself in its manifesting of beings, in the coming-topresence of beings, it remains itself concealed. It remains itself
a manifesting, not a manifested. Being needs therefore, to be
brought from concealment to non-concealment. The analysis
of Dasein as the place where Being is revealed, and also forgotten, shows that this comprehension takes place through the
temporal structure of Dasein and thus suggests that "time"
is the clue or horizon through which the meaning of Being can
be questioned. SZ has not thought Being, however, merely by
giving this clue or discovering this horizon. Heidegger concludes his analysis insisting that " the dispute in regard to the
interpretation of Being cannot be straightened out, because it
has not even been begun." (SZ, 437)
It can be surmised from this that Heidegger would argue that
the trouble with Rahner's evaluation of SZ is that it has not
even recognized the question. It completely misses the point.
Rahner's principle criticism of Heidegger, however, is not
based on the analyses of SZ so much as on the arguments of
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WM. According to Rahner the conclusion of these arguments
seems to be that the ultimate sense of being is " nothingness."
This criticism again misses the real issue. It is true that in WM
Heidegger proposes to understand Being in terms of the
problem of "Nothing" (Nichto). Heidegger's use of this tenn,
however, is carefully nuanced and should not be equated with
some sort of metaphysical "nothingness."
WM was originally written as a lecture for an audience composed mostly of scientists. It proposed to introduce a question
which the sciences as such do not consider, namely, the
metaphysical question. It must be noted from the start, however, that Heidegger is defining metaphysics as he conceives it,
not as it has been conceived historically.
Heidegger maintains that the sciences consider that which-is
and nothing more. He claims that the "and nothing more"
is intrinsic to the sciences' conception of their subject matter.
But how conceive this Nothing ,vithout representing it as some
thing? The question, "What is Nothing?" seems to demand
the illogical reply that, "Nothing is this or that thing," when
it is known perfectly ,veIl that Nothing is not any thing. To
avoid this" logical" problem Heidegger suggest an examination
of the off-the-cuff definition of Nothing as the negation of the
totality-of-what-is. This could perhaps be reasonably maintained if the totality-of-what-is could be known or conceived in
itself, but it cannot. Thus another impass has been reached. It
is not an inescapable impasse Even though the whole of whatis in its totality is not accessible in itself, "it is equally
certain that we find ourselves placed in the midst of what-is and
that this is somehow revealed in totality." (WM,333) Ho\v
is it revealed? Recalling the analysis of SZ, Heidegger maintains that the totality is grasped on the level of " disposition,"
and that this grasp is revealed in moods such as boredom or
the joy felt in the presence of a loved one. This dispositional
awareness constitutes an essential mode of Dasein's being-inthe-world. As Rahner noted, it is not just a matter of feeling
but the ground for the possibility of any knowledge of beings.
Unfortunately this awareness of the totality-of-what-is still does
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not tell anything about Nothing, for it is a revelation of and
absorption in the totality-oI-what-is. It appears to exclude any
revelation of the opposite, that which absolutely is not, namely,
Nothing. Heidegger maintains, however, that there are moods,
although perhaps rare, which reveal Nothing itself. Such is
the mood of profound dread (Angst). Heidegger's description
of this mood is classic.
In dread, as we say, " one feels something uncanny." 'Vhat is this
" something" (es) and this "one"? Weare unable to say
what gives " one" the; uncanny feeling. One just feels it generally
(im Ganzen). All things and we \vith them, sink into a sort of
indifference. But not in the sense that everything simply disappears; rather, in the very act of dra ,ving a ,vay from us everything turns towards us. This withdrawal of what-is-in-totality,
which the)! crowds round us in dread, this is 'v hat oppresses us.
There is nothing to hold on to. The only thing that remains and
overwhelms us whilst what-is slips away, is this" nothing."
Dread reveals Nothing .
. . . Dread hold us in suspense because it makes what-is-intotality slip away froln us. (WM, 336)

The experience of dread witnesses, then, what Heidegger describes most evocatively as the failure of all '" Is '-saying
(' 1st'-Sagen)." (vVM, 336)
Heidegger concludes from this analysis that negation does
not precede or ground the grasp of Nothing9 but on the contrary, the grasp or Nothing precedes and grounds negation.
Nothing is revealed but not as any thing, and not as the
negation of any or even all things. This grasp of Nothing is
not just an interesting but irrelevant fact. Science, our knowledge of what-is, knows what-is only in distinction from what-isnot (i. e., Non-being or No-thing). Similarly, SZ and KM
argued that knowledge of beings (what-is) is possible only because Dasein can pass beyond that which-is. \Vhat is the tenn
of this passing beyond? It is not any thing, not what-is-intotality, but rather Nothing-that is to say, no thing. Nothing
turns out to be one with Being as such. It is to Being as not
any thing that Dasein transcends, and it is Being a.s Nothing
which makes the revelation of what-is possible.
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Nothing is neither an object nor anything that" is" at all. Nothing
occurs neith~ by itself nor "apart from" what-is, as a sort of
adjunct. Nothing is that which makes the revelation of what-i&
as such possible for our human existence. (WM, 340)

Here is the essential difference between Rahner's notion of
Being and Heidegger's. RahLer maintains that the subject can
know beings only because it sees them within the horizon of
a "more." This seeing within the horizon of a more is possible
because the subject already grasps (though non-thematically)
absolute being in the direction of all human thought and
activity. He claims, therefore, that negation and the concept
of non-being are derived from this grasp of the limited as
limited (i. e., partially negated) in terms of absolute being.
What is most important is that he claims that these observations constitute the basis for a proof of God's existence.
Heidegger, on the other hand, does not maintain as Rahner
suggests that Dasein transcends toward nothingness. Rather,
he argues that'Dasein transcends (the term is misleading) to
Being as no thing. Heidegger claims that a metaphysical
analysis such as Rahner's leaves unasked the question about
the meaning of Being as different from beings and as that
" different" which makes the revelation of beings possible.
Rahner had argued that the knowledge of beings demands as
its condition of possibility a VorgrifJ of an absolute being.
Heidegger maintains to the contrary, not that knowledge of
beings must be explained by nothingness but that it can be
explained sufficiently only by the recognition that Dasein
grasps Being as different from beings. In the later works
Heidegger comes to the realization (the famous "turn") that
it is not just that Dasein grasps Being as different from beings
but rather that Dasein itself is grasped-grasped in the
" event" of the ontological difference. Still it is the ontological
difference which opens up the world of beings and Being to
Dasein.
Rahner uses the term" ontological difference" in Hearers
of the Word, and in The Thomist Spectrum Helen John claims
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that Rahner is aware of the ontological difference. 1s It appears
from what has been seen here, however, that in a metaphysical
context that term must have a very different meaning than
Heidegger gives it. Heidegger would argue that to think the
meaning of this difference in terms of being-even in terms of
a supreme absolute having-being-is an extrapolation which
has avoided the real question that needs asking. Such thinking
represents Being as a being instead of probing the meaning of
Being as such. It assumes an answer to the question which
Heidegger wants to pose. WM, therefore, does not propose
that man transcends toward nothingness. Rather it suggests
that before we ask about the possibility of Dasein transcending
to something, we ought first to ask what is Being as such, as
different from beings. The reflection on Non-being or Nothing
was intended, like the analysis of Dasein in SZ, to serve as an
introduction to the question about Being as Heidegger understands it. How, then, phrase the ground question of metaphsics? Heidegger suggests the formula: "Why is there any
being at all-why not far rather nothing?" (WM, 345)
The implications of this formula are developed in An
Introduction to Metaphysics. It should be clear by now that
for Heidegger the phrase" rather than nothing" is not a mere
explication of the question, " Why are there beings?" Rather,
it indicates that the question asked is not a question about
beings. It is a question about Being as such, for it "remains
unclear what is to be thought under the name' Being.'" (EM,
26) Heidegger claims that "here we are asking about something which we barely grasp, which is scarcely more than the
sound of a word for us ...." (EM, 27) Intrinsic, then, to the
question "Why are there beings rather than nothing? " is the
question "How does it stand with Being?" It is "indispensable that we make it clear from the very outset how it
stands at present with Being and with our understanding of
Being." (EM, 27) In asking this question Heidegger does not
propose to define Being, for, as he insisted even in SZ, Being
18

Helen James John, The Thomist Spectrum (New York, 1966), p. 168.
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is not a thing and therefore cannot be defined. Rather, he
claims that the question ,,; How does it stand with Being?"
seeks to rediscover for its own what the word "Being" says.
It does not seek meaning in a statement but in a question and
in a questioning attitude, through which Heidegger hopes to
recapture or retrieve the begil~ning of our "historical-spiritual
existence." (EM, 32) Heidegger insists again that "fundamental ontology" in SZ did not designate a branch of philo~
sophy which deals only with a doctrine about beings (i. e.,
their cause and nature) but rather signified "the endeavor to
make Being manifest itself, and to do so by the question ' how
does it stand with Being?' (and not with beings as such)."
(EM, 34) Heidegger maintains that the very asking of this
question is the only way to experience the sense of Being. In
asking it Being is manifested even though in a way which is
at once both totally indeterminate and highly determinate.
(cf. EM, 60) The question of Being, therefore, does not seek
something which we know, or can know-except by questionIng.
The true problem is \vhat we do not know and what, insofar as
we kno,v it authentically, namely as a problem, ,ve know only
questioningly.
To know ho,v to qu~stion means to know how to wait, even a
,vhole lifetime. But an age \vhich regards only ,vhat goes fast and
can be clutched with both hands looks on questioning as " remote
from reality" and as something that does not pay, ,vhose benefits
cannot be numbert;d. But the essential is not number. . . .
(EM, 172)

This last statement perhaps raises more questions than it
ans\vers. How does one know Being questioningly? How does
one think Being as such, that is to say, as different from beings?
It is just this question that focuses Heidegger's reflection in
his later work, and it is in reference to this question that the
sense of " hearing" or " attending" is developed. A thorough
and adequate examination of this problem would demand more
attention than it is possible to give it here, but some idea of
what sense "hearing" can have in regard to Heidegger's
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question of Being can be indicated by pursuing the analysis
of EM a little further.
In Rahner's summary of Heidegger's thought it was observed
that Heidegger opposes any consideration of the Being question
in terms of logic. In our analysis of WM it was sho\vn that the
reason Heidegger opposes the domination of the question of
Being by logic is that logic as understood today is a science
which deals with the consideration of beings. In the third
section of the fourth chapter of EM Heidegger considers the
relation of Being and thought. In that discussion it becomes
clear that Heidegger opposes logic because there is a more
primary sense of XoyoS' which is the ground of what \ve no\v
understand by the term. This more primary sense of logos is
what ought to determine our thought. In the development of
this notion the sense of " hearing" is presented.
Heidegger maintains that logic as the science of thought is
today understood as the science of statements. Thinking, in
this view therefore, is determined by the statement. Logo.fIJ
dl
· means " t 0 speak ,"
means " word " or " d·lscourse "an
egezn
as in dialogue or monologue. Heidegger argues, however, that for
the Greeks logos originally meant" to gather" or " to collect.!"
Heidegger cites examples from Homer and Heraclitus to illustrate his point and claims that the sense of these passages
can be understood only if we understand logos as originally
denoting the collecting collectedness of Being as that which
manifests beings.
Logos characterizes Being in a ne\v and yet old respect: that
which is, which stands straight and distinct in itself, is at the
same time gathered togetherness in itself and by its~lf, and
maintains itself in such togetherness. (EM, 110)

Logos is thus, according to Heidegger, originally understood as
Being itself insofar as it is the gathering together of all that
is. "Logos here signifies neither meaning nor word nor doctrine,
and surely not' meaning of a doctrine '; it means: the original
collecting collectedness which is in itself perlnanently dominant." (EM, 108)
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Heidegger notes that there is one text, however, which seems
to contradict his theory. In Fragment 50 a connection is made
between logos and" hearing" which seems to suggest that logos
is something "audible" (i. e., a word or speech): "If you
have heard not me but tb~ logos, then it is wise to say
accordingly: all is one." (EM, 108) Heidegger argues that
Heraclitus is not referring here to a hearing of words" but to
a hearing or attending to that which makes words possible,
namely, an attending to Being itself. Only in this way can
it be explained why men are described by Heraclitus as
uncomprehending when they confront the logos. Heidegger
maintains that properly understood Fragment .50 says "do
not attach importance to words but heed the logos." For
Heidegger then, "Tnle hearing has nothing to do \vith ear
and mouth, but means to follow the logos and what it is,
namely, the collectedness of beings itself." (EM, 109)
Thus by "hearing" Heidegger once again refers us to the
Being question. There can be true speaking and hearing only
in an attending to Being itself. As Heidegger sees it, this
attending is in fact the origin of the definition of man in terms
of logos. The definition is not accomplished by " seizing upon
any attributes in the living creature called 'man' as opposed
to other living creatures." Rather" being-human is logos, the
gathering and apprehending of the Being of beings: it is the
happening of that strangest of all, in whom through violence,
through acts of power . . ., the overpowering is made manifest
and made to stand." (EM, 143) " Hearing" for Heidegger,
therefore, defines the essence of man as "existence," as the
place where Being is manifested and is thus quite different
from Rahner's notion of man as a " hearer."
H

j

*

*

*

It is unfortunate that Heidegger's notion of the type of
thought proper to Being cannot be pursued further. 14 This
14 See William J. Richardson's H eidegger:
Through Phenomenology to Thought
(The Hague, 1968), to which the thesis presented here is much indebted.
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essay, however, was meant only as a preliminary delimitation
of the essential difference between Rahner's thought and
Heidegger's, and this aim has been reached. It is at the very
level of the question asked that their philosophies confront
each other. It seems necessary to stress that this difference is
prior to, although not separate from, the question of methodology. I say this because Thomists who attempt to evaluate
Heidegger's philosophy often seem to suggest that the real
difference between their metaphysics and Heidegger's phenomenology is that the latter, because of the limitations of his
method, cannot pursue the question of being as far as the
metaphysician can. This interpretation seems to imply that
the limitations of this methodology are due primarily to
epistemological presuppositions. Rahner, for example, does
not seem to feel that there is any reason why, if he wanted,
Heidegger could not advance his thought beyond fundamental
ontology to the question of God-which, of course, is what
Rahner does as a follower of Aquinas. But this interpretation
presupposes that, although Heidegger's method is different, his
question is the same.
It has been shown here, however, that the question is not
the same----or at least Heidegger does not believe it is the same.
The question of Being as Heidegger experiences it is a question
about Being as such. It is a question about that" manifesting"
by which beings are manifest. It is not a question of representing the "beingness" of beings either in terms of what is
common to them or in terms of the being (absolute or otherwise) that is their cause. In fact, the question of Being is not
a question of representing any thing. It is a question about
that which is not a being, which cannot be thought (represented) as a being, but which nevertheless is manifested as the
manifesting of beings. It is a question, which as far as we have
followed it here, finds its resolution in the questioning itseifman attending to Being. If this is true, Heidegger's notion of
Being is not so much determined by his method, as his method
is determined by the question itself. Heidegger does not make
the metaphysical move beyond Being to God, because he
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believes that such a move originates from a radical misunderstanding of Being.
Does this mean that, if one accepts Heidegger's analysis, one
must forsake the problem of God and consequently the philosophy of religion? Although it seems clear that one would have
to forsake the metaphysical "Gcd" and the philosophy of
religion as Rahner understands it, it is not at all clear to me
that one would have to forsake either God or theology,
although both would have to be thought through at a much
more fundamental level.
ROBERT MASSON
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